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1 Introduction
The American writer Kurt Vonnegut began his career in the public relations division
of General Electric. One day, he saw a new milling machine operated by a punch-card
computer outperform the company’s best machinists. This experience inspired him to
write a novel called “Player’s Piano.” It describes a world in which school children take
a test at an early age that determines their fate. Those who pass, become engineers
and design robots used in production. Those who fail, have no jobs and live from
government transfers. Are we converging to this dystopian world? How should public
policy respond to the impact of automation on the demand for labor?
These questions have been debated ever since 19th-century textile workers in the
U.K. smashed the machines that eliminated their jobs. As the pace of automation
quickens and affects a wide range of economic activities, Bill Gates re-ignited this
debate by proposing that robots should be taxed.
In this paper, we use a simple model of automation to compare the equilibrium that
emerges under the current U.S. tax system (which we call the status quo), the first-best
solution to a planner’s problem without information constraints, and the second-best
solutions associated with different configurations of the tax system.
Our model has two types of workers which we call routine and non-routine. Routine
workers perform tasks that can be automated by using intermediate inputs that we refer
to as robots.1 We find that robot taxes are optimal only when there is partial automa-
tion. These taxes help increase the wages of routine workers, giving the government
an additional instrument to reduce income inequality. Once there is full automation,
it is not optimal to tax robots. Routine workers do not work, so taxing robots distorts
production decisions without reducing income inequality.2
1See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu (2017) for a discussion of the
impact of automation on the job market for routine workers.
2These results show that the reason why it can be optimal to tax robots in our model differs from
the rationale used by Bill Gates to motivate robot taxation. Gates argued that robots should be taxed
to replace the tax revenue that the government collected from routine workers before their jobs were
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Under the current U.S. tax system, modeled using the after-tax income function
estimated by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017), full automation never occurs.
As the cost of automation falls, the wages of non-routine workers rise while the wages
of routine workers fall to make them competitive with robot use. The result is a large
rise in income inequality and a substantial decline in the welfare of routine workers.
The level of social welfare obtained in the status quo is much worse than that
achieved in the first-best solution to an utilitarian social planner problem without in-
formation constraints. But this first-best solution cannot be implemented when the
government does not observe the worker type. The reason is that the two types of
agents receive the same consumption but non-routine workers supply more labor than
routine workers. As a result, non-routine workers have an incentive to act as routine
workers and receive their bundle of consumption and hours worked.
To circumvent this problem, we solve for the optimal tax system imposing, as in
Mirrlees (1971), the constraint that the government does not observe the worker type or
the workers’ labor input. The government can observe total income and consumption of
the two types of workers, as well as the use of robots by firms. We assume that taxes on
robots are linear for the reasons emphasized in Guesnerie (1995): non-linear taxes on
intermediate inputs are difficult to implement in practice because they create arbitrage
opportunities. This assumption, which is standard in a Ramsey (1927) setting, restricts
the outcomes that can be achieved when robot taxation is optimal.
A Mirrleesian optimal tax system can improve welfare relative to the status quo. In
fact, it can yield a level of welfare that is close to that of the first-best solution. Unfor-
tunately, Mirrleesian tax systems are known to be complex and potentially difficult to
implement in practice.
For this reason, we study the optimal policy when the tax schedule is constrained
to take a simple, exogenous form. Specifically, we consider the income tax schedule
automated. In our model, when there is full automation the government collects no tax revenue from
routine workers yet it is optimal not to tax robots.
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proposed by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) and linear robot taxes. We
compute the parameters of the income tax function and the robot tax rate that maxi-
mize social welfare. We find that income inequality can be reduced by raising marginal
tax rates and taxing robots. Tax rates on robot use can be as high as 30 percent and full
automation never occurs, so routine workers keep their jobs. But this solution yields
poor outcomes in terms of efficiency and distribution.
We consider a modification of the Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) tax
schedule that allows for lump-sum rebates that ensure that all workers receive a mini-
mum income. We find that this modification improves both efficiency and distribution
relative to a tax system without rebates.
In the three best systems in terms of welfare, the first-best, Mirrleesian optimal
taxes and simple income taxes with lump-sum rebates there is full automation once the
costs of automation are sufficiently low. These solutions resemble the world of “Player’s
Piano.” Only non-routine workers have jobs. Routine workers live off government trans-
fers and, despite losing their jobs, are better off than in the status quo.
One might expect that optimal robot taxation would follow from well-known princi-
ples of optimal taxation in the public finance literature. We know from the intermediate-
goods theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) that it is not optimal to distort produc-
tion decisions by taxing intermediate goods. Since robots are in essence an intermediate
good, taxing them should not be optimal.
The intermediate-good theorem relies on the assumption that “net trades” of differ-
ent goods can be taxed at different rates. In our context, this assumption implies that
the government can use different tax schedules for routine and non-routine workers.
We study two environments where there are limits to the government’s ability to tax
different workers at different rates, Mirrlees (1971)-type information constraints and
a simple exogenous tax system common to both types of workers. We find that it is
optimal to tax robots in both environments when there is partial automation.
We know from the work of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) that when the income
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tax system is non-linear it is not optimal to distort production decisions by taxing
intermediate goods. But, as stressed by Naito (1999) and Jacobs (2015), Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976)’s result depends critically on the assumption that workers with different
productivities are perfect substitutes in production. This assumption does not hold in
our model. Taxing robots can be optimal because it loosens the incentive compatibility
constraint of non-routine workers.
We extend our model to allow agents to switch their occupations by paying a cost.
In the first-best solution, agents who have a low cost of becoming non-routine workers
do so. Those with a high cost become routine workers. Once the costs of automation
are sufficiently low, there is full automation; agents for whom it is too costly to become
non-routine lose their jobs and live from government transfers.
In the Mirrlees solution to the model with occupational choice it is optimal to use
robot taxes to loosen the incentive compatibility constraint of non-routine workers. The
planner can use the income tax schedule to redistribute income or to induce more agents
to become non-routine workers. When the cost of becoming non-routine are high (low),
the planner resorts more (less) to using the income tax schedule to redistribute income.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our model of automation.
Section 3 describes the status-quo equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium under the current
U.S. income tax system and no robot taxes. Section 4 describes the first-best solution
to the problem of an utilitarian planner. In Section 5, we analyze a Mirrleesian second-
best solution to the planner’s problem. In Section 6, we study numerically the optimal
tax system that emerges when income taxes are constrained to take the functional
form proposed by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) both with and without
lump-sum rebates. In Section 7, we compare the different policies we consider both in
terms of social welfare and of the utility of different agents. Section 8 discusses the
model with endogenous occupation choice. Section 9 relates our results to classical
results on production efficiency in the public finance literature. Section 10 concludes.
To streamline the main text, we relegate the more technical proofs to the appendix.
4
2 Model
In this section, we discuss a simple model of automation that allows us to address the
optimal tax policy questions posed in the introduction. The model has two represen-
tative households who draw utility from consumption of private and public goods and
disutility from labor. One household supplies routine labor and the other non-routine
labor. The consumption good is produced with non-routine labor, routine labor and
robots. Robots and routine labor are used in a continuum of tasks. They are both
perfect substitutes in performing these tasks.3
Households There are two representative households, one composed of non-routine
workers and the other of routine workers. The index j = n, r, denotes non-routine and
routine labor, respectively.
Household j derives utility from consumption, Cj, and from the provision of a public
good, G. Each household has one unit of time and derives disutility from labor (Nj).
The household’s utility function is given by
Uj = u(Cj)− v(Nj) + g(G). (1)
The functions u(Cj) and g(G) are differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. The
function v(Nj) is differentiable, strictly increasing and convex. In order to guarantee
that the optimal choices of consumption and leisure are interior solutions, we assume
that the following conditions hold: limCj→0 u
′(Cj) =∞ and limNj→1 v′(Nj) =∞.
Household j chooses Cj and Nj to maximize utility (1), subject to the budget
constraint
Cj ≤ wjNj − T (wjNj),
3Autor, Levy and Murmane (2003) study the importance of tasks performed by routine workers
in different industries. They then discuss the impact of automating these tasks on the demand for
routine labor.
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where wj denotes the wage rate received by the household type j and T (·) denotes the
income tax schedule.
We now describe the problem of the firms, starting with the firms that produce
robots.
Robot producers Final good producers can use robots in tasks i ∈ [0, 1]. The cost
of producing a robot is the same across tasks and is equal to φ units of output. Robots
are produced by competitive firms. A representative firm producing robots to automate
task i maximizes profits
pii = max
xi
pixi − φxi.
It follows that
pi = φ,
and that pii = 0.
Final good producers The representative producer of final-goods hires non-routine
labor (Nn), routine labor (ni) for each task i, and buys intermediate goods (xi) which
we refer to as robots, also for each task i. There is a continuum of tasks that can be
performed by either routine labor or robots. We denote by m the fraction of these
tasks that are automated, i.e. performed by robots. For convenience, we assume that
when m tasks from the continuum [0, 1] are automated, the automated tasks are in the
interval [0,m].4
The production function is given by
Y = A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
Nαn , (2)
with α ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (0, 1).
4Since tasks are symmetric, there is no loss of generality associated with this assumption.
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The problem of the firm is to maximize profits,
pi = Y − wnNn − wr
ˆ 1
m
nidi− (1 + τx)
ˆ m
0
φxidi,
where Y is given by (2), and τx is an ad-valorem tax rate on intermediate goods.
The optimal choices of Nn, xi for i ∈ [0,m], ni for i ∈ (m, 1] require that
wn = αA
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
Nα−1n , (3)
(1 + τx)φ = (1− α)A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
−1
Nαn x
ρ−1
i , for i ∈ [0,m] (4)
wr = (1− α)A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
−1
Nαnn
ρ−1
i , for i ∈ (m, 1] (5)
are satisfied. It follows that it is optimal to use the same level of routine labor, ni in
the 1 −m tasks that have not been automated and that the optimal use of robots is
also the same in the m automated tasks.
´The optimal level of automation is m = 0 if wr < (1 + τx)φ. The firm chooses to
fully automate (m = 1) and to employ no routine workers (ni = 0) if wr > (1 + τx)φ.
If wr = (1 + τx)φ, the firm is indifferent between any level of automation m ∈ [0, 1]. In
this case, equations (4) and (5) imply that the levels of routine labor and robots are
the same,
xi = nl, for i ∈ [0,m] and l ∈ (m, 1] .
Since the technology has constant returns to scale, profits are zero, pi = 0.
Government The government chooses taxes and the optimal level of government
spending, subject to the budget constraint
G ≤ T (wrNr) + T (wnNn) +
ˆ m
0
τxφxidi. (6)
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Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of allocations {Cr, Nr, Cn, Nn, G, ni, xi,m}, prices
{wr, wn, pi}, and a tax system {T (·), τx} such that: (i) given prices and taxes, alloca-
tions solve each households’ problem; (ii) given prices and taxes, allocations solve each
firm’s problem; (iii) the government budget constraint is satisfied; and (iv) markets
clear.
The market clearing condition for routine labor is
ˆ 1
m
nidi = Nr. (7)
The market-clearing condition for the output market is
Cr + Cn +G ≤ A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
Nαn −
ˆ m
0
φxidi. (8)
The market clearing condition (7), and firms first-order condition (5) imply
ni =
Nr
1−m , for i ∈ (m, 1] .
In an equilibrium with automation (m > 0) in which wr = (1 + τx)φ, we also have
xi =
Nr
1−m , for i ∈ [0,m]
In such an equilibrium, using equation (4) together with the two previous conditions,
we obtain
m = 1−
[
(1 + τx)φ
(1− α)A
]1/α
Nr
Nn
. (9)
The wage rates of both non-routine and routine labor are independent of preferences,
wn = α
A1/α(1− α) 1−αα
[(1 + τx)φ]
1−α
α
, (10)
wr = (1 + τx)φ. (11)
The reason for this result is twofold. In an equilibrium with automation, the real
wage of routine workers must equal the cost of using robots, (1 + τx)φ. Since the
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production function is constant returns to scale, optimizing the use of robots and routine
workers yields a production that is linear in non-routine labor. So, the marginal product
of non-routine labor is constant and independent of the number of non-routine labor
hours employed by the firm.
It is also useful to note that in any equilibrium
wrNr
Y
= (1− α)(1−m),
wnNn
Y
= α.
An increase in automation reduces the income share of routine workers while keeping
constant the share of non-routine workers. In this sense, an increase in automation
leads to an increase in pre-tax income inequality.
3 The status-quo equilibrium
In this section, we describe the status-quo equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium under the
current U.S. income tax system and no taxes on robot use (τx = 0). We model the U.S.
income tax system using the empirically-plausible functional form for after-tax income
proposed by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017). In their specification, the
after-tax income of household j, y(wjNj), is given by
y(wjNj) = λ(wjNj)
1−γ, (12)
where γ < 1. Using PSID data, Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) estimate
that γ = 0.181, which means that income taxes are close to linear. They find that their
specification yields a good fit to the data with an R2 of 0.91.
This formulation implies that total and average taxes paid by agent j are given by
T (wjNj) = wjNj − λ(wjNj)1−γ,
T (wjNj)
wjNj
= 1− λ(wjNj)−γ.
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The parameter λ controls the level of taxation, higher values of λ imply lower average
taxes. The parameter γ controls the progressivity of the tax code. When γ is positive
(negative), the average tax rate rises (falls) with income, so the tax system is progressive
(regressive).
We assume in all our numerical work that the utility function takes the form:
u(Cj)− v(Nj) + g(G) = log(Cj) + ζ log(1−Nj) + χ log(G). (13)
We set ζ = 1.63, so that in the status-quo equilibrium agents choose to work one
third of their time endowment. We choose χ = 0.25 and assume that the government
sets government spending equal to 20 percent of output and adjusts λ to satisfy its
budget constraint. Given our choice for χ, this policy is optimal in the sense that it
maximizes the average utility of the two workers in the economy. On the production
side, we normalize A to one and choose α = 0.5, so that the wages of routine and non-
routine workers are identical in the absence of automation. These parameter choices
are used in all of our numerical experiments.5
We vary φ, the cost of producing robots on the interval Φ = (0; (1−α)A]. The upper
bound of the interval, (1− α)A, is the lowest value of φ consistent with no automation
in the status quo (see equation (9)).
Figure 1 describes the effect of changes in the cost of automation. As φ falls, the
wage of routine workers fall and the wage of non-routine workers rises. Since the utility
function is logarithmic and wages are the only source of income, hours worked remain
constant for both routine and non-routine workers. This property reflects the offsetting
nature of income and substitution effects. Given that as φ falls, wages of routine workers
fall and their hours worked remain constant, their income, consumption and utility fall.
In contrast, non-routine workers benefit from rising income, consumption and utility.
As φ falls, the parameter that controls the level of taxation, λ, rises, which implies a
5The equilibrium is independent of the value of ρ, the parameter that controls the elasticity of
substitution between different tasks. The reason for this result is that all the factors (non-routine
workers and/or robots) used in equilibrium to perform these tasks have the same marginal cost.
10
decline in the overall level of taxation. This decline is due to the fact that non-routine
workers pay an increasing share of the tax revenue and their income rises faster than
output as φ falls.
In sum, our analysis suggests that the current U.S. tax system will lead to massive
income and welfare inequality in response to a fall in the costs of automation.
4 The first-best allocation
A first-best allocation solves a problem where the social planner maximizes a social-
welfare function subject to the economy’s resource constraints. In this problem, there
are no restrictions on the ability of the planner to transfer income across agents.
We assume that the planner has an utilitarian social welfare function which as-
signs equal weights to the utilities of the individual agents. The planner chooses
Cr, Nr, Cn, Nn, G,m, {xi, ni} to maximize average utility,
V =
1
2
[u(Cr)− v(Nr) + g(G)] + 1
2
[u(Cn)− v(Nn) + g(G)] .
One interpretation of the social welfare function is as follows. Workers are identi-
cal ex-ante because they do not know whether their skills can be automated or not,
i.e. whether they will be routine or non-routine workers. The planner maximizes the
worker’s ex-ante expected utility.
The planner’s resource constraints are
Cr + Cn +G ≤ Y − φ
ˆ m
0
xidi, (14)
Y = A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
Nαn , (15)
ˆ 1
m
nidi = Nr. (16)
We derive in the appendix the solution to this problem. The first-best solution
shares three properties with the competitive equilibrium. First, routine labor is evenly
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allocated to the tasks that have not been automated, ni = Nr/(1 −m), for i ∈ (m, 1]
and is zero otherwise. Second, intermediate goods are evenly allocated to the activities
that have been automated. Third, for m ∈ (0, 1) the level of intermediate goods used
in each automated activity is the same as the amount of labor used in non-automated
activities, xi = Nr/(1−m) for i ∈ [0,m].
The expression for the level of automation that occurs in the first best is the same
as in the status-quo equilibrium,
m = max
{
1−
[
φ
(1− α)A
]1/α
Nr
Nn
, 0
}
, (17)
because in both cases robot use is not taxed.
Labor supply decisions in the first best are determined by the following conditions
v′(Nn)
u′(Cn)
=
αY
Nn
, (18)
v′(Nr)
u′(Cr)
≥ (1−m) (1− α)Y
Nr
, (19)
where αY/Nn is the marginal product of non-routine workers and (1−m) (1− α)Y/Nr
is the marginal product of routine workers. These conditions hold in a competitive
equilibrium with zero marginal income taxes.
It is optimal to equate the marginal utility of consumption of the two types of work-
ers. Since utility is separable in consumption, achieving that goal requires equalizing
the consumption of the two households
Cr = Cn.
Finally, the optimal provision of public goods equates their marginal utility to their
opportunity cost in terms of private consumption,
g′(G) =
1
2
u′(Cn).
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Equations (18), (19), together with the fact that Cr = Cn, imply that the worker
with the highest marginal product works the most. This property implies that non-
routine workers have lower utility than routine workers. As a result, this equilibrium
cannot be implemented when the government observes total income but does not ob-
serve agent types. The reason is that non-routine workers would choose to act as routine
workers in order to receive higher utility. In the next section, we analyze the optimal
tax system taking into account the information constraints that the worker type and
the labor input are not directly observed by the government.
Figure 2 illustrates the properties of the first-best. In panel A, we see that full
automation occurs once φ falls below 0.31. The real wage rate for both types of workers
are the same as in the status-quo equilibrium.6 The consumption and utility of both
agents rise as φ falls. Figure 2 also shows that implementing the first-best solution
requires large transfers from non-routine to routine workers.
5 Mirrleesian optimal taxation
In this section, we characterize the optimal non-linear income tax in the presence of
automation, when the government observes an agent’s total income but does not observe
the agent’s type or labor supply, as in the canonical Mirrlees (1971) problem. As
discussed in the introduction, we focus on the case where robot taxes are linear.
In the Mirrlees (1971) model, the productivities of the different agents are exogenous.
In our model, these productivities are endogenous and depend on τx. This property is
central to the question we are interested in studying: is it optimal to distort production
decisions by taxing the use of robots to redistribute income from non-routine to routine
workers to increase social welfare?
6The reason for this property is as follows. Equations (10) and (11) imply that wages depend on
technological parameters (α and A), the cost of automation, and the value of τx. Since τx = 0 in the
status quo and there is production efficiency in the first-best allocation, the wages are the same in
both allocations.
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We assume that φ < αα(1 − α)1−αA, so that if τx ≤ 0 non-routine workers earn a
higher wage, wn > wr in an equilibrium with automation (see equations (10) and (11)).
Note that an increase in τx raises the wage of routine workers and lowers the wage rate
of non-routine agents.
When working with Mirrleesian-style optimal taxation problems, it is useful to ex-
press the problem in terms of the income instead of hours worked. The income earned
by agent j is
Yj = wjNj. (20)
The planner’s problem is to choose the allocations {Yj, Cj}, G, and τx to maximize
social welfare
V =
1
2
[u(Cr)− v (Yr/wr) + g(G)] + 1
2
[u(Cn)− v (Yn/wn) + g(G)] , (21)
subject to the resource constraint
Cr + Cn +G ≤ Yn τx + α
α(1 + τx)
+
Yr
1 + τx
. (22)
and two incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
u(Cn)− v (Yn/wn) ≥ u(Cr)− v (Yr/wn) , (23)
u(Cr)− v (Yr/wr) ≥ u(Cn)− v (Yn/wr) , (24)
The wages of the two types of workers are dictated by production and are given by
equations (10) and (11).
Any competitive equilibrium satisfies equations (22), (23), and (24). In addition,
any allocation that satisfies these three equations can be decentralized as a competitive
equilibrium.
Household optimality implies that the utility associated with the bundle of con-
sumption and income assigned to agent j, {Cj, Yj}, must be at least as high as the
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utility associated with any other bundle {C, Y } that satisfies the budget constraint
C ≤ Y − T (Y ):
u(Cj)− v(Yj/wj) ≥ u(C) + v(Y/wj), (25)
In particular, routine workers must prefer their bundle, {Cr, Yr}, to the bundle of non-
routine workers, {Cn, Yn}. Similarly, non-routine workers must prefer their bundle,
{Cn, Yn}, to the bundle of routine workers, {Cr, Yr}. These requirements correspond to
the two IC constraints, (23), and (24), so these conditions are necessary.
We show in the Appendix that equation (22) is necessary by combining the first-
order conditions to the firms’ problems with the resource constraint, (18). In addition,
we show that conditions (23), (24), and (22) are also sufficient. To see that (23)
and (24) summarize the household problem note that it is possible to choose a tax
function such that agents prefer the bundle Cj, Yj no any other bundle. For example,
the government could choose a tax function that sets the agent’s after-tax income to
zero for any choice of Y different from Yj, j = r, n. These results are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Equations (22), (24) and (23) characterize the set of implementable
allocations. These conditions are necessary and sufficient for a competitive equilibrium.
Since the government can choose an arbitrary tax function, it is only bound by the
incentive compatibility constraints which characterize the informational problem. This
property means that the income tax function that is assumed here to implement the
optimal allocation is without loss of generality. Any other implementation would at
least have to satisfy the same two incentive constraints.
The tax on intermediate goods provides the government with an additional instru-
ment relative to the Mirrlees (1971) setting. The planner can use this instrument to
affect the income of the two types of workers but its use creates a divergence between
an agents’ productivity and his wage rate. We now describe some useful results for this
economy, which are proved in the appendix.
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Proposition 2. The agent with a higher pre-tax wage has a higher pre-tax income and
consumption, i.e. if wi > wj then Yi ≥ Yj and Ci ≥ Cj. This result implies that the
incentive compatibility constraint for agent i binds.
Proposition 3. If wi > wj, the incentive compatibility of agent i binds with equality
and the condition Yi ≥ Yj is equivalent to the incentive compatibility constraints of the
two agents.
To bring the analysis closer to a canonical Mirrleesian approach, we maximize the
planner’s objective in two steps. First, we set τx to a given level and solve for the
optimal allocations. Second, we find the optimal level of τx. We define the level of
social welfare conditional on a value of τx, as
W (τx) = max
Cn,Cr,Yn,Yr
1
2
[u(Cr)− v (Yr/wr) + g(G)] + 1
2
[u(Cn)− v (Yn/wn) + g(G)]
subject to
u(Ci)− v (Yi/wi) = u(Cj)− v (Yj/wi) ,
Yi ≥ Yj,
Cr + Cn +G ≤ Yr τx + α
α(1 + τx)
+
Yn
1 + τx
.
where the index i denotes the agent with the higher pre-tax wage. An optimal choice
of τx requires that W
′(τx) = 0.
Proposition 4. In the optimal plan, if automation is incomplete (m < 1 and Yr > 0)
and the monotonicity constraint does not bind then robot taxes are strictly positive
(τx > 0).
To see the intuition for this result, suppose first that τx < 0, then wn > wr. A
marginal increase in τx has two benefits. First, it strictly increases output and hence
the amount of goods available for consumption. Second, it reduces the relative wage
wn/wr and makes the non-routine worker less inclined to mimic the routine workers.
16
This property can be easily seen by rewriting the IC for non-routine workers in terms
of hours worked,
u(Cn)− v(Nn) ≥ u(Cr)− v (wrNr/wn) .
The second part of this result establishes that production efficiency is not optimal,
so it is optimal to tax robot use. The intuition for this result is as follows. Since a
zero tax on robots maximizes output, a marginal increase in that tax produces only
second-order output losses. On the other hand, increasing τx generates a first-order
gain from loosening the informational restriction. Therefore, a planner that chooses
τx = 0 can always improve its objective with a marginal increase in τx.
Robot taxes are optimal only when automation is incomplete (m < 1), so non-
routine workers are employed in production (Yr > 0). When full automation is optimal
(m = 1, Yr = 0) there are no informational gains from taxing robots. Since the robot
tax distorts production and does not help loosen the IC of the non-routine agent, the
optimal value of τx is zero. We prove this result in the appendix.
Now, we turn to the study of the optimal wedges. In what follows, we assume that
Yn ≥ Yr is a non-binding constraint. The optimality conditions imply the following
marginal rates of substitution
v′(Yn/wn)
u′(Cn)
= wn
τx + α
α(1 + τx)
v′(Yr/wr)
u′(Cr)
≥ 0.5− ηn
0.5− ηn v′(Yr/wn)/wnv′(Yr/wr)/wr
wr
1 + τx
, (= if Yr > 0).
In Mirrlees-type problems it is common to be optimal to not distort the choices of
high-ability agents. In contrast, in our model non-routine workers are subsidized at the
margin when automation is incomplete. This subsidy corrects the distortion created by
robot taxes, which make the wages of non-routine workers lower than their marginal
productivity.
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Routine workers are taxed at the margin when automation is incomplete for two
reasons. First, this tax corrects the distortion created by robot taxes, which make
the wages of routine workers higher than their marginal productivity. Second, taxing
routine workers makes it less appealing for non-routine workers to mimic routine workers
and loosens the IC of non-routine workers.
Figure 3 illustrates the properties of the equilibrium associated with Mirrleesian
optimal taxation. We see that full automation occurs for values of φ lower than 0.26.
The robot tax is positive, reaching a maximum value of 10 percent. This tax is used only
when automation is incomplete. With complete automation, routine workers supply
zero hours. At that point, taxing robots to raise the wages of routine workers does not
help reduce income inequality. Since taxing robots distorts production and doesn’t help
redistribute income, it is optimal to set these taxes to zero.
Consumption of non-routine workers is higher than that of routine workers. Since
non-routine workers work harder than routine workers, the former need to receive higher
consumption to satisfy their IC constraint. Both types of workers see their consumption
rise as φ goes towards zero. This outcome is achieved through large transfers to the
routine workers.
Once there is full automation, the utility of routine and non-routine workers is equal-
ized. This property follows from the IC constraint for non-routine workers (equation
(23)). This constraint is binding and when automation is full, the pre-tax income of
routine workers is zero, and the right-hand side of the equation is equal to the utility
of the routine worker.
6 Optimal policy with simple income taxes
The previous section describes the optimal income tax in the presence of Mirrlees-style
information constraints. Despite its natural appeal, this optimal tax schedule can be
complex and difficult to implement. For this reason, in this section we characterize the
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optimal tax policy when the after-tax income schedule is constrained to have the simple
form proposed by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) (see equation (12)).
When the government is restricted to setting income taxes consistent with the func-
tional form (12), the competitive equilibrium in the economy can be summarized by
the following conditions:
Cn = λ(αY )
1−γ, (26)
Nn =
1− γ
1− γ + ζ , (27)
Cr = λ[(1− α)(1−m)Y ]1−γ, (28)
Nr =
1− γ
1− γ + ζ , (29)
m = max
{
1−
(
φ(1 + τx)
(1− α)A
)1/α
Nr
Nn
, 0
}
, (30)
Y = A
(
Nr
1−m
)1−α
Nαr , (31)
Cn + Cr +G ≤ Y − φ m
1−mNr, (32)
xi =
Nn
1−m, for i ∈ [0,m], (33)
ni =
Nn
1−m, for i ∈ (m, 1], (34)
pi = φ. (35)
Taking the ratio between equations (26) and (28), we can see that a necessary condition
is
Cr
Cn
=
[
(1− α)(1−m)
α
]1−γ
. (36)
This equation shows that there are two ways to make the ratio Cr/Cn closer to one.
The first is to raise τx which leads to a fall in the level of automation, m. The second,
is to make γ closer to one, i.e. make the tax system more progressive. Both approaches
have drawbacks. Taxing robot use reduces production efficiency and making the tax
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system more progressive reduces incentives to work. To see the latter effect, note that
hours worked are given by equations (27) and (29). As γ approaches one, hours worked
approach zero.
We can think of the planner as choosing allocations {Cr, Cn, G,m} and progressivity
γ, subject to (36) and
Cr + Cn +G ≤ A
(
1
1−m
)1−α
1− γ
1− γ + ζ − φ
m
1−m
1− γ
1− γ + ζ , (37)
which represents the resource condition in the equilibrium definition, where the vari-
ables Y , Nn and Nr have been replaced by their equilibrium expressions. These two
conditions are necessary and sufficient to describe the set of implementable allocations
in terms of {Cr, Cn, G,m} and γ. They are necessary because they follow from straight-
forward manipulations of equilibrium conditions. Furthermore, given any allocations
{Cr, Cn, G,m} and γ that satisfy these two constraints, we can use equation (26) to find
a value for λ; such a value for λ also satisfies equation (28), since equation (36) must
be satisfied. In addition, equations (27) and (29) can be used to find solutions for Nn
and Nr, respectively. Given an optimal allocation for m, equation (30) can be solved
by a choice of τx, and equation (31) yields a value for Y . These solutions, together with
equation (37), imply that equation (32) is also satisfied. Finally, equation (33) can be
used to solve for a value for each xi, equation (34) for each ni, and equation (35) for pi.
Optimality implies the following condition
µ
A(1− α)
(1−m)(1− γ + ζ)
[
(1−m)α − φ
A(1− α)
]
= 0.5− Cr
Cr + Cn
, (38)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint, (37). This
expression implies that when automation is incomplete, robot use is always taxed. To
see this result, it is useful to note that when τx = 0 the equilibrium level of automation
is such that7
1−m =
[
φ
(1− α)A
]1/α
. (39)
7This result reflects the fact that in equilibrium Nn = Nr .
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Equation (39) implies that the left-hand side of equation (38) is equal to zero which
is possible only when the Cr = Cn. Since the instruments available to the government
are distortionary, it is in general not optimal to equalize the consumption of the two
agents. Equation (38) implies that when Cn > Cr , the level of m is lower that that
implied by the competitive equilibrium with τx = 0. So, in order for equation (38) to
hold, τx must be positive.
Figure 4 shows that the form of the tax function constrains heavily the outcomes
that can be achieved. Full automation never occurs and robot taxes are used for all
values of φ reaching values as high as τx = 0.33. As the costs of automation decline, the
progressivity of the income tax rises. But there is still a large divergence in wage rates,
consumption and utility across the two types of workers. The reason is the transfers
from non-routine to routine workers are relatively modest.
Optimal policy with lump-sum rebates In both the first-best allocation and the
Mirrlees-style allocation, routine workers drop out of the labor force once automation
costs are sufficiently low. That property is absent in an equilibrium where taxes take
the form proposed by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017). The reason is
simple. Equation (12) implies that when before-tax income is zero, after-tax income is
also zero. A worker who drops out of the labor force has zero consumption and −∞
utility. In order to make the outcomes that can be achieved with a simple tax system
closer to the Mirrlees-style allocation we now consider the case where the government
can use a lump-sum rebate, Ω.
In this specification, the after-tax income of household j is
y(wjNj) = λ(wjNj)
1−γ + Ω. (40)
To simplify the algebra, it is useful to think of the planner as choosing ω such that
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ω = Ω/ (λY 1−γ). Consumption levels and working hours for each agent are given by
Cr = λY
1−γ[[(1− α)(1−m)]1−γ + ω] (41)
Nr =
1− γ
1− γ + ζ + ζω
[(1−α)(1−m)]1−γ
(42)
Cn = λY
1−γ[α1−γ + ω] (43)
Nn =
1− γ
1− γ + ζ + ζω/α1−γ (44)
The planner chooses allocations {Cn, Cr,m} and the instruments {γ, ω}, subject to
Cn =
{
α1−γ + ω
[(1− α)(1−m)]1−γ + ω
}
Cr, (45)
Cr + Cn +G = A
[
Nr
(1−m)
]1−α
Nαn − φ
m
1−mNr, (46)
ω ≥ 0, (47)
where Nr and Nn are given by equations (42) and (44). Equations (45), (46) and (47)
are necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium.
In this economy, the lump-sum transfer plays a similar role to tax progressivity. The
consumption ratio is given by,
Cr
Cn
=
[(1− α)(1−m)]1−γ + ω
α1−γ + ω
,
It is easy to see that when Cr/Cn < 1, an increase in ω increases Cr/Cn, reducing con-
sumption inequality. However, lump-sum rebates have to be financed with distortionary
income taxes.
Figure 5 illustrates the properties of this allocation. In this equilibrium, income
is redistributed through a large lump-sum transfer, in other words, the government
guarantees a minimum income to all agents in the economy. Workers have two sources
of income: wages and transfers. For this reason, income and substitution effects of
changes in wages are no longer offsetting. As a consequence, the two types of workers
supply a different number of hours and their hours vary with φ. When automation is
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incomplete, robot taxes are used as an additional source of redistribution and τx can
go as high as 35 percent. Complete automation occurs for values of φ lower than 0.2.
When automation is incomplete, the income tax is regressive (γ < 0) to reduce the
distortions on the labor supply of the non-routine agents.
7 Comparing different policies
In this section, we compare the first-best allocation with the allocations associated with
different policies in terms of social welfare and the utility of routine and non-routine
workers. In the figures discuss below we use the labels FB, SQ, OT, ST and STL to
refer to the first-best, status quo, Mirrleesian optimal taxes, simple taxes, and simple
taxes with lump-sum rebates, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the utility of the social planner for values of φ in the interval (0, (1−
α)A]. Recall that (1−α)A is the lowest value of φ for which there is no automation in
the status quo. Social welfare rises as the costs of automation fall both for the first best
and for all the policies we consider. We see that the Mirrlees allocation is relatively
close in terms of welfare to the first-best allocation. The solution with simple taxation
and rebates ranks next in terms of welfare, followed by the solution with simple taxes
without rebates. The status quo is by far the worst allocation.
A fall in the cost of automation can have very different consequences for routine
and non-routine workers. To illustrate this property, we measure the utility of the two
types of workers relative to the status-quo equilibrium with φ = (1−α)A. We call this
allocation the no-automation benchmark. Panel A (B) of Figure 7 shows how much
routine (non-routine) workers would pay as percentage of consumption to go back to
the no-automation benchmark for different values of φ.
Panel A of Figure 7 shows that the utility of routine workers in the first-best al-
location improves as φ falls. In contrast, in the status quo, routine workers become
increasingly worse off as φ falls. With Mirrleesian optimal taxation, routine workers
23
are made better off once φ becomes sufficiently low (lower than 0.35). For simple taxes
with and without rebates, routine workers are better off than in the no-automation
benchmark for values of φ lower than 0.21 and 0.09, respectively.
Figure B of Figure 7 shows that non-routine workers prefer the no-automation
benchmark to the first best for high levels of φ (higher than 0.23). This preference
reflects the large transfers that non-routine workers make to routine workers in the
first best. For values of φ lower than 0.23, non-routine workers prefer the first best to
the no-automation benchmark. The reason is that the wage of non-routine workers is
high enough to compensate the transfers they make to routine workers. For values of φ
lower than 0.39 non-routine workers prefer the status quo to all other allocations. This
preference results from a combination of high wages and relatively low taxes.
For any level of φ lower that (1−α)A, routine workers rank the first-best allocation
first, Mirrleesian optimal taxation second, simple taxes with rebates third, and simple
taxes without rebates fourth and the status quo last. In contrast, non-routine workers
rank the status quo first and the first best last. Mirrleesian optimal taxation and simple
taxes with and without rebates rank in between the two extremes.
8 Endogenous occupational choice
In this section, we study the optimal tax policy in a version of our model that allows
agents to choose whether to become routine or non-routine workers. In this model,
taxing robots affects the relative wages of routine and non-routine workers thereby
affecting occupational choices.
Our analysis is related to Saez (2004) and Gomes, Lozachmeur and Pavan (2017).
These authors characterize Mirrlees-style optimal tax plans in models with endogenous
occupational choice. Saez (2004) considers a setting in which agents choose their oc-
cupation but hours worked are fixed. Income is proportional to the wage rate so the
government can infer a worker’s occupation from his income. This property allows the
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government to design the income tax schedule to effectively tax different occupations
at different rates. As a result, it is not optimal to distort production. Gomes, Lozach-
meur and Pavan (2017) consider a setting in which agents choose both their occupation
and hours worked. They find that the optimal tax plan does not feature production
efficiency.
Our approach borrows from both Saez (2004) and Gomes et al. (2017). As in Saez
(2004), agents in our model have different preferences for the two occupations. As in
Gomes et al. (2017), agents in our model can choose both their occupation and the
number of hours worked. We find that production efficiency is generally not optimal in
our model.
Households There is a continuum of measure one of households indexed by the oc-
cupation preference parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R. This parameter is drawn from a distribution
F , with continuous density f . Household preferences are given by
u (Cθ)− v (Yθ/wθ) + g(G)−Oθθ, (48)
where Cθ and Yθ denote the consumption and income of household θ, respectively. The
indicator Oθ denotes the household’s occupational choice. It takes the value 1 when
the household chooses a non-routine occupation and 0 otherwise. The wage rate earned
by the household depends on the individual occupation choice. It is equal to wr if the
household chooses a routine occupation and equal to wn otherwise.
The utility representation above has the following interpretation: households have
heterogeneous preferences with respect to different occupations. A household with a
positive θ has a “natural” preference for routine work. All else equal, the household
would prefer a routine occupation over a non-routine occupation. If instead θ < 0, the
household prefers non-routine occupations.
The problem of the household is to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
Cθ ≤ Yθ − T (Yθ) . (49)
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It is useful to define the set of households that in equilibrium choose to become non-
routine workers, Θn ≡ {θ ∈ Θ : O(θ) = 1} and the set of household that in equilibrium
choose to become routine workers Θr ≡ Θ−Θn.
Mirrleesian optimal taxation The production side is the same as in previous sec-
tions. We maintain the assumption that the only instrument the government has to
directly affect production is a proportional tax on robots. With these assumptions, the
firms’ decisions, when automation is interior, can be summarized by the constraint
ˆ
Θ
Cθf(θ)dθ +G ≤ τx + α
α(1 + τx)
ˆ
Θn
Yθf(θ)dθ +
´
Θr
Yθf(θ)dθ
1 + τx
. (50)
We assume the government moves first and chooses a tax schedule, T (·). Given the tax
schedule, the household then chooses the occupation. Finally, the households choose
hours of work, earn income, pay taxes, and consume.
As in Rothschild and Scheuer (2013), we characterize a direct implementation where
households declare their type θ and get assigned an allocation (Cθ, Yθ,Oθ). Income
and consumption are observable, but the government cannot observe labor, wage or
sectoral choice. Given this informational asymmetry, the constraints that guarantee
truth-telling are as follows. The first condition is the same incentive compatibility
constraint on the intensive margin (hours worked) that we have used before:
u (Cθ)− v (Yθ/wθ) ≥ u (Cθ′)− v (Yθ′/wθ) , ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. (51)
This incentive compatibility constraint guarantees that the household chooses the as-
signed allocation, given the occupational choice.
The second condition is the incentive compatibility on the choice of occupation for
the individual type θ:
u (Cθ)− v (Yθ/wθ)−Oθθ ≥ u (Cθ′)− v (Yθ′/wθ′)−Oθ′θ, ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. (52)
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This extensive-margin incentive compatibility ensures that the household chooses the
assigned occupation. The other conditions are that the occupational choice, Oθ, defines
the sets Θn and Θr and that (50) holds.
8
Proposition 5. An incentive compatible allocation {Cθ, Yθ,Oθ}θ∈Θ can be implemented
by a non-linear income tax schedule T (y) common to all agents.
To characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive-compatible oc-
cupational choice, it is useful to define utility net of the occupational preference, θ,
Uθ ≡ u (Cθ)− v (Yθ/wθ) . (53)
Proposition 6. An allocation is incentive compatible for occupational choice if and
only if for θ, θ′ ∈ Θi then Uθ = Uθ′ ≡ Ui for i = r, n, and there exists a threshold
θ∗ = Un − Ur such that
(i) If θ ≤ θ∗ then θ ∈ Θn;
(ii) If θ > θ∗ then θ ∈ Θr.
This proposition follows directly from the incentive compatibility constraints. The
first part of the proposition states that all agents who share the same occupation choice
must have the same utility level. This property results from the fact that they can
mimic the choices of another household in the same group at zero cost. So, if an
8These constraints do not explicitly take into account the possibility that agent θ might choose an
allocation (Cθ′ , Yθ′) at a different occupational choice than Oθ′ . However, those additional constraints
are redundant. To see this result, suppose that agent θ deviates to an allocation (Cθ′ , Yθ′) and occu-
pational choice Oθˆ which is different from that of Oθ′ . From the intensive margin incentive constraint
for agent θˆ it follows that
u(Cθ′)− v(Yθ′/wθˆ)−Oθˆθ ≤ u(Cθˆ)− v(Yθˆ/wθˆ)−Oθˆθ ≤ u(Cθˆ)− v(Yθ/wθ)−Oθθ,
where the last inequality follows from the extensive margin incentive constraint for θ. This condition
also guarantees that when choosing his own assignment, Oθ is optimal.
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allocation was better than all others for the same occupation, all agents would choose
the best allocation.
The second part of the proposition establishes that the incentive compatibility con-
straints for the extensive margin choice can be summarized by a single threshold rule.
Agents with θ lower than θ∗ choose a non-routine occupation and the remaining agents
become routine workers.
Proposition 7. In the optimal plan, if θ, θ′ ∈ Θi then Yθ = Yθ′ ≡ Yi and Cθ = Cθ′ ≡ Ci,
for i = r, n.
Agents who choose the same occupation are essentially identical. They have the
same preferences for consumption and leisure, and the same productivity. Since the
planner has an utilitarian welfare function, the optimal plan sets the same consumption
and hours worked for all agents with the same occupation.
Using these results, we can see that, for a fixed τx, the optimal plan solves the
following optimization problem:
W (τx) = [u (Cn)− v (Yn/wn)]F (θ∗) + [u (Cr)− v (Yr/wr)] (1− F (θ∗)) + g(G)−
ˆ θ∗
−∞
θf(θ)dθ,
u (Cn)− v (Yn/wn) ≥ u (Cr)− v (Yr/wn) ,
u (Cr)− v (Yr/wr) ≥ u (Cn)− v (Yn/wr) ,
θ∗ = [u (Cn)− v (Yn/wn)]− [u (Cr)− v (Yr/wr)]
CnF (θ
∗) + Cr (1− F (θ∗)) +G ≤ YnF (θ∗) τx + α
α(1 + τx)
+
Yr (1− F (θ∗))
1 + τx
.
Optimizing with respect to τx requires W
′(τx) = 0.
The solution to this problem can be decentralized with the mechanism we describe
above, in which the government moves first and chooses {T (·), τx}. In this decentral-
ization, the government sets τx to its optimal level and sets income taxes such that
T (Yn) = Yn − Cn, and T (Yr) = Yr − Cr,
and T (Y ) = Y for Y 6= Yr, Yn.
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Numerical analysis We now illustrate the properties of the occupational choice
model with some numerical examples. We use the same preference and production
parameters as previous sections.9
We set Θ = R and assume that F (θ) is a normal distribution with mean zero and
standard deviation σ. This choice ensures that half the population has a preference
for routine work and the other half for non-routine work. We solve the model for two
values of σ, 1 and 2.
Figure 8 shows the first-best solution for both values of σ. We can see that lower
dispersion of θ is associated with a higher share of non-routine workers. This property
makes intuitive sense, since having more agents with θ close to zero implies that it is
easier to switch them to more productive non-routine occupations. This higher fraction
of non-routine workers also results in higher consumption and lower working hours
for all households. Because it is easier to switch agents to non-routine occupations,
automation advances faster when dispersion is lower.
Figure 9 shows the Mirrlees solution for the same levels of σ. In both cases there
is positive taxation of robots when automation costs are sufficiently high. These taxes
are higher when dispersion is also higher.
To see the intuition that underlies this result, we need to understand the mechanisms
that the planner can use to improve the distribution of utility. First, the planner can
use the income tax schedule. We refer to this approach as direct redistribution. Second,
the planner can induce more agents to become non-routine workers. We refer to this
approach as indirect redistribution.
The optimal plan balances the costs and benefits from each form of redistribution.
For σ = 1, the costs of indirect redistribution are low, so the planner induces a higher
fraction of the population to become non-routine. In fact, for low automation costs the
share of non-routine workers becomes higher than in the first-best allocation.
9In the numerical analysis we compare the Mirrleesian solution to the first-best solution in this
environment. We solve for the first best in the appendix.
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For σ = 2, the costs of indirect redistribution are high, so the planner resorts to
using more direct redistribution. This approach results in higher consumption and
lower hours worked for routine workers. Because hours work decline faster when σ is
higher, automation also advances more rapidly as φ falls. We can also see that the
share of non-routine workers is lower than in the first-best.
For σ = 1, the planner engages in less direct redistribution and prefers to induce
more agents to switch to non-routine occupations. Since taxes on robots are desirable
only so far as they improve the direct redistribution mechanism, the reduced importance
of this form of redistribution also implies that taxes on robots should be lower.
For both values of σ robot taxes reach zero before full automation is implemented.
This property reflects the need to provide incentives for agents to choose non-routine
occupations. Because of these incentives, the intensive margin incentive compatibility
of the non-routine worker no longer binds for values of φ that are low but are asso-
ciated with incomplete automation. For these values of φ it is not optimal to distort
production.
9 Relation to the public finance literature
Our results stand in sharp contrast to the celebrated Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result
that an optimal tax system should ensure efficiency in production and therefore leave
intermediate goods untaxed. In our framework, this property would imply that the tax
on robots should be zero. Another important reference is Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976).
These authors argue that in an economy with Mirrleesian income taxes distorting the
use of commodities is not optimal, as long as these commodities are separable from
leisure in the utility function. Since uniform taxation can be interpreted as production
efficiency, those results may also appear to contradict ours. In this section, we discuss
the relation between these different results.
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Relating our results to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) It is central to the
Diamond-Mirrlees intermediate good theorem that all net trades can be taxed at po-
tentially different (linear) rates. In our model, this property would mean that the labor
of the two types of workers can be taxed at different rates. At the heart of the failure of
the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) theorem in our model is the fact that the government
cannot discriminate between the two types of workers.
The result in Diamond and Mirrlees holds if we assume that the planner can use
different linear taxes for routine and non-routine workers, λr and λn. In this case,
household optimality implies that
v′(Nj)
u′(Cj)
= λjwj, and Cj = λjwjNj.
With the ability to affect each marginal rate of substitution independently, the only
constraints faced by the planner are the resource constraint
Cr + Cn +G ≤ A
(
Nr
1−m
)1−α
Nαn − φ
m
1−mNr,
and the implementability conditions for household optimality
u′(Cj)Cj − v′(Nj)Nj = 0, forj = r, n.
These three conditions are necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium.
When the government can use different tax rates for each type of worker, the level
of intermediate goods appears only in the resource constraint and not in the imple-
mentability condition. Since intermediate goods do not interfere with incentives, they
are chosen to maximize output for given levels of hours worked. This objective is
achieved by not distorting production, setting τx = 0.
When the tax system requires both types of worker to pay the same tax rate (λr =
λn), the planner has to distort the labor supply decisions of the two types of workers in
the same way, which gives rise to the following additional implementability restriction
v′(Nn)/u′(Cn)
v′(Nr)/u′(Cr)
=
wn
wr
. (54)
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The value of τx no longer appears only in the resource constraint, it appears in
equation (54) because the wage ratio is a function of τx. As a result, to relax restriction
(54), it might be optimal for the planner to choose values of τx that are different from
zero.
This result depends crucially on the fact that different labor types interact differently
with the intermediate good, which means that distorting the use of intermediate goods
affects in different ways the wage rates of different workers. If the production function
was weakly separable in labor types and intermediate inputs, the wage ratio would be
independent of the usage of intermediate inputs and production efficiency would be
optimal.
In our model, robots are substitutes of routine workers and complements of non-
routine. A tax on robots decreases the wage rate of non-routine workers and increase
the wage rate of routine workers. This property means that it can be optimal to use
robot taxes.
Relating our results to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) In the Mirrleesian op-
timal taxation problem, the planner can choose the entire income tax schedule. One
might expect production efficiency to be optimal given that income taxes are very flex-
ible. Indeed, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that, for preferences that are separable
between commodities and leisure, uniform commodity taxation is optimal which im-
plies the optimality of production efficiency. Naito (1999) shows that the Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) result relies on the absence of general-equilibrium effects of taxation on
wages and prices and that in the presence of these effects uniform commodity taxation
may not be optimal.10 His analysis focuses on an economy in which the intensity of
high- and low-skilled workers in production varies across goods. This form of produc-
10Jacobs (2015) shows that production efficiency is generally not optimal in a model where com-
modity prices are exogenous but wages are not. In his model, goods are produced with commodities
and labor according to production functions that are worker specific. Taxation of commodities has a
differential impact on the marginal productivities and wages of the different workers.
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tion non-separability implies that commodities interact differently with different agent
types and, as a result, it might be optimal to deviate from uniform commodity taxation.
A similar form of non-separability is also present in our model, which is why it can be
optimal to tax robots.
The intuition for the importance of general-equilibrium effects of taxation on wages
and prices is the same we used in discussing proposition 4. Because the government does
not know the type of the agent and only observes income, it is restricted to use incentive
compatible tax systems. Since different types interact differently with the intermediate
good, distorting production decisions may help in the screening process. To see this
property, it is useful to write the incentive compatibility constraint as follows:
u(Ci)− v(Ni) ≥ u(Cj)− v (wjNj/wi) .
Crucially, this incentive compatibility constraint involves the wage ratio. Whenever the
taxation of intermediate goods affects this ratio, production efficiency may no longer
be optimal. When intermediate goods are not separable in production from the two
labor types, taxing intermediate goods affects the wage ratio and it might be optimal
to distort production.
The importance of general-equilibrium effects of taxes on wages in shaping the
optimal tax policy was originally emphasized by Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982) in
a Mirrlees (1972) environment. Mirrlees (1972) assumes that production is linear in
labor, so taxation does not affect wages through general-equilibrium effects. Stiglitz
(1982) and Stern (1982) show that when production is not linear in labor, the optimal
tax schedule is more regressive than in Mirrlees (1972) and the top marginal income tax
is negative instead of zero.11 The reason for this result is that it is optimal to encourage
high-skilled workers to exert more effort so as to reduce their relative wages, making
their incentive compatibility constraint easier to satisfy.
11Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) generalize the results of Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) to an
environment in which occupational choice is endogenous and there is a continuous distribution of
agent types.
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In sum, the classical results on production efficiency in the public finance literature
depend on one of two key assumptions: (i) the government can tax differently every
consumption good and labor type; or (ii) the environment is such that production
distortions do not help in shaping incentives. Both assumptions fail in our model. On
the one hand, the government cannot design income tax systems that independently
target each type of worker. On the other hand, robots are substitutes for routine
workers and complements to non-routine workers, so a tax on robots affects the ratio
of the wages of these two types of workers.
Our results and the literature on the optimal taxation of capital For sim-
plicity, we use a static model to study the optimal taxation of robots. We model robots
as intermediate goods that are close substitutes to routine labor and complements to
non-routine labor. These intermediate goods could be long lived and take time to build.
Would our results be different in a model in which robots are a durable intermediate
good? In this setting, taxing robots creates intertemporal distortions in addition to
static production inefficiency. There are other reasons why it might be optimal to
introduce intertemporal distortions, which are well understood from the literature on
capital taxation (see Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2016) for a recent overview). First,
it might be optimal to use intertemporal distortions to confiscate the initial stock of
durable goods, which are in inelastic supply. Second, intertemporal distortions can be
optimal when the elasticities of the marginal utility of consumption and labor are time
varying. Third, intertemporal distortions can be optimal to provide insurance in models
with idiosyncratic risk. These reasons are orthogonal to the motives for taxing robots
studied in this paper.
Most economies tax capital income. Whether or not this tax distorts the accumula-
tion of capital depends on whether investment can be expensed for tax purposes. When
this expensing is allowed, as proposed in the current U.S. tax reform, capital income
taxes do not distort the accumulation of capital (see Abel (2007)). In this case, when
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robots are a form of capital their accumulation is not distorted. Our analysis suggests
that, in so far as taxing robots is optimal, it might desirable to limit the expensing of
investment in robots.12
10 Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that without changes to the current U.S. tax system, a sizable
fall in the costs of automation would lead to a massive rise in income inequality. Even
though routine workers keep their jobs, their wages fall to make them competitive with
the possibility of automating production.
Income inequality can be reduced by raising the marginal tax rates paid by high-
income individuals and by taxing robots to raise the wages of routine workers. But this
solution involves a substantial efficiency loss for the reduced level of inequality.
A Mirrleesian optimal income tax can reduce inequality at a smaller efficiency cost
than the variants of the U.S. tax system discussed above, coming close to the levels of
social welfare obtained in the first-best allocation. Unfortunately, this tax system can
be complex and difficult to implement.
An alternative approach is to amend the tax system to include a rebate that is
independent of income. In our model, with this rebate in place, it is optimal to tax
robots for values of the automation cost that lead to partial automation. For values
of the automation cost that lead to full automation, it is not optimal to tax robots.
Routine workers lose their jobs and live off government transfers, just like in Kurt
Vonnegut’s “Player’s piano.”
12This policy was recently implemented in South Korea. See “South Korea introduces world’s first
’robot tax’,” in The Telegraph, August 9, 2017.
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A Appendix
A.1 The first-best allocation
We define the first-best allocation in this economy as the solution to an utilitarian wel-
fare function, absent informational constraints. This absence implies that the planner
can perfectly discriminate among agents and enforce any allocation. The optimal plan
solves the following problem
V = max
{Cr,Nr,Cn,Nn},G,m,{xi,ni}
1
2
[u(Cr)− v(Nr) + g(G)] + 1
2
[u(Cn)− v(Nn) + g(G)] .
Cr + Cn +G ≤ A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
Nαn −
ˆ m
0
φxidi, [µ],
ˆ 1
m
nidi = Nr, [η].
The first-order conditions with respect to ni and xi are
µ(1− α)A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
−1
Nαnn
ρ−1
i = η, ∀i ∈ (m, 1]
(1− α)A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
−1
Nαn x
ρ−1
i = φ, ∀i ∈ [0,m].
The first equation implies that the marginal productivity of routine labor should be
constant across the activities that use routine labor. This property means that ni =
Nr/(1−m) for i ∈ (m, 1] and ni = 0, otherwise. The same property applies to robots
used in the activities where they are used, xi = x for i ∈ [0,m] and xi = 0, otherwise.
To characterize the optimal allocations we replace ni and xi in the planner’s problem,
which can be rewritten as
V = max
{Cr,Nr,Cn,Nn},G,m,x
∑
j=r,n
1
2
[u(Cj)− v(Nj) + g(G)] .
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Cr + Cn +G ≤ A
[
mxρ + (1−m)
( Nr
1−m
)ρ] 1−αρ
Nαn − φmx, [µ].
The first-order conditions with respect to x and m are, respectively,
(1− α)A
[
mxρ + (1−m)
( Nr
1−m
)ρ] 1−αρ −1
Nαn x
ρ−1 = φ,
1− α
ρ
A
[
mxρ + (1−m)
( Nr
1−m
)ρ] 1−αρ −1
Nαn
[
xρ − (1− ρ)
( Nr
1−m
)ρ]
= φx.
The ratio of these two equations implies that if automation is positive, m > 0, then
x = Nr/(1−m). Using this condition, we obtain
V = max
{Cr,Nr,Cn,Nn},G,m,x
∑
j=r,n
1
2
[u(Cj)− v(Nj) + g(G)] .
Cr + Cn +G ≤ A
( Nr
1−m
)1−α
Nαn − φm
Nr
1−m, [µ].
The first-order condition with respect to the level of automation implies that
(1− α)A 1
(1−m)2−αN
1−α
r N
α
n − φ
Nr
(1−m)2 = 0⇔ m = 1−
[ φ
A(1− α)
]1/αNr
Nn
,
provided that m is interior. Then,
m = max
{
1−
[ φ
A(1− α)
]1/αNr
Nn
, 0
}
.
Furthermore, the first-order conditions with respect to Cr, Cn, Nr, Nn, and G are
1
2
u′(Cr) = µ,
1
2
u′(Cn) = µ,
1
2
v′(Nr) ≥ µ
Nr
(1− α)(1−m)Y,
1
2
v′(Nn) = µαY,
g′(G) = µ.
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The first-order condition with respect to Nr is presented with inequality, because the
constraint Nr ≥ 0 may bind when automation costs are low. The combination of the
first two equations implies that
u′(Cr) = u′(Cn)⇔ Cr = Cn.
The optimal marginal rates of substitution are given by the combination of the marginal
utility of consumption and leisure for each individual
v′(Nr)
u′(Cr)
≥ (1− α)(1−m) Y
Nr
,
v′(Nn)
u′(Cn)
= α
Y
Nn
.
Finally, from the first-order conditions for G and Cj it follows that
g′(G) =
1
2
u′(Cj). (55)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In an equilibrium, robot producers set the price of robots equal to their marginal cost
pi = φ. (56)
Optimality for final goods producers implies that
xi =
{
Nr
1−m , i ∈ [0,m],
0, otherwise
(57)
ni =
{
Nr
1−m , i ∈ (m, 1],
0, otherwise
(58)
m = max
{
1−
[(1 + τx)φ
(1− α)A
]1/αNr
Nn
, 0
}
, (59)
Y = A
[ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
] 1−α
ρ
Nαn , (60)
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wr = (1− α)(1−m) Y
Nr
, (61)
wn = α
Y
Nn
. (62)
The resource constraint is
Cr + Cn +G = Y −
ˆ m
0
φxi, (63)
We can let equation (56) define the price of robots, equation (57) define xi, equations
(58), (59) and (60) determine ni, m, and Y , respectively. Assuming that m is interior,
the wage equations (61) and (62) can be written as (10) and (11). These equations can
be used to solve for the equilibrium wage rates. Combining the results above, we can
write the resource constraint as
Cr + Cn +G = α
A1/α(1− α) 1−αα
[(1 + τx)φ]
1−α
α
τx + α
α(1 + τx)
Nn + φNr.
Replacing Nj = Yj/wj, the resource constraint can be written as
Cr + Cn +G = Yn
τx + α
α(1 + τx)
+
Yr
1 + τx
. (64)
This derivation makes it clear that resource constraint (64) is necessary and sufficient
for optimality in the production side of the economy.
Household optimality requires that
u(Cj)− v
(Yj
wj
)
≥ u(C)− v
( Y
wj
)
, ∀(C, Y ) : C ≤ Y − T (Y ).
The following incentive compatibility are necessary constraints
u(Cn)− v
(Yn
wn
)
≥ u(Cr)− v
( Yr
wn
)
,
u(Cr)− v
(Yr
wr
)
≥ u(Cn)− v
(Yn
wr
)
.
These are also sufficient conditions, because the planner can set the tax schedule T (·)
such that for all Y 6∈ {Yn, Yr} the allocation is worse for both agents than their respective
allocation. T (Y ) = Y is an example of such a mechanism.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
By adding the two incentive compatibility constraints, we obtain
v
( Yi
wj
)
− v
(Yj
wj
)
≥ v
(Yi
wi
)
− v
(Yj
wi
)
.
Since v(·) is a convex function and wi > wj, a necessary and sufficient condition is
Yi ≥ Yj.
Then, from the IC for i we can see that
u(Ci)− u(Cj) ≥ v
(Yi
wi
)
− v
(Yj
wi
)
≥ 0,
which implies that Ci ≥ Cj.
We now show by contradiction that the incentive compatibility of agent i binds.
Suppose we have found a solution where that IC is not binding, then
u(Ci)− v
(Yi
wi
)
> u(Cj)− v
( Yi
wj
)
,
which implies that Ci > Cj. Suppose then a different allocation where Yi, Yj, G and τx
are kept at the same level but C ′i = Ci−  and C ′j = Cj + , for some small  > 0, which
preserves the inequality
u(C ′i)− v
(Yi
wi
)
≥ u(C ′j)− v
( Yi
wj
)
.
This new allocation is still resource feasible and loosens the incentive compatibility
constraint for agent j.
Concavity of u(·) guarantees that welfare evaluated at this new allocation is strictly
greater than the initial candidate solution, which contradicts the premise that the initial
allocation was a solution to the problem.
We have already shown that the condition Yi ≥ Yj is necessary. It remains to be
shown that it can replace the incentive compatibility of agent j. We now show that
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since the IC of i binds with equality, Yi ≥ Yj implies the IC of j
u(Ci)− u(Cj) = v
(Yi
wi
)
− v
( Yi
wj
)
≤ v
( Yi
wj
)
− v
(Yj
wj
)
⇒ u(Ci)− v
( Yi
wj
)
≤ u(Cj)− v
(Yj
wj
)
.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We follow the same strategy used to prove Proposition 4. To produce a contradiction
suppose not, suppose we find an allocation {Cn, Yn, Cn, Yn, G, τx} such that τx ≤ 0.
Using the previous results, we know that wn > wr. This result implies that Yn ≥ Yr,
Cn ≥ Cr, and the IC of the non-routine worker binds. These allocations solve the
original optimization problem, or equivalently they solve
W (τx) = max
Cr,Cn,Yn,Yn,G
∑
j
[
u(Cj)− v
(Yj
wj
)
+ g(G)
]
, s.to.
u(Cn)− v
(Yn
wn
)
= u(Cr)− v
( Yr
wn
)
, [ηn],
Yn ≥ Yr, [ψ],
Cr + Cn +G ≤ Yn τx + α
α(1 + τx)
+
Yr
1 + τx
, [µ].
The envelope condition is
W ′(τx) =− v′
(Yn
wn
)
(1 + ηn)
Yn
wn
1− α
α(1 + τx)
+ v′
(Yr
wr
)Yr
wr
1
1 + τx
,
+ ηnv
′
( Yr
wn
) Yr
wn
1− α
α(1 + τx)
+
µ
1 + τx
[
Yn
1− α
α(1 + τx)
− Yr
1 + τx
]
.
The first-order conditions for optimality imply that
v′
(Yn
wn
)
(1 + ηn)
1
wn
= µ
τx + α
α(1 + τx)
+ ψ.
v′
(Yr
wr
) 1
wr
= µ
1
1 + τx
+ ηnv
′
( Yr
wn
) 1
wn
− ψ.
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Replacing these expressions in the envelope condition implies
W ′(τx) = −µτx 1− α
α2(1 + τx)2
+ ηnv
′
( Yr
wn
) Yr
wn
1
α(1 + τx)
− ψ Yn
α(1 + τx)
.
If the monotonicity constraint doesn’t bind then ψ = 0. In this case, as long as τx ≤ 0
then W ′(τx) > 0.
A.4.1 The full automation case (m = 1, Yr = 0)
If the optimal plan has Yr = 0 then Yn > 0, which follows from the Inada conditions on
utility. This result implies that ψ = 0. From the envelope condition we can see that
W ′(τx) = −µτx 1− α
α2(1 + τx)2
= 0⇔ τx = 0. (65)
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Let A = {Cθ, Yθ,Oθ}θ∈Θ be an incentive compatible allocation. Define
T (Y ) =
{
Yθ − Cθ, if (Cθ, Yθ,Oθ) ∈ A,
Y, otherwise.
For agent θ, Oθ is an optimal choice for the bundle (Cθ, Yθ). To see this result note
that since
u(Cθ′)− v(Yθ′/wθ′) ≥ u(Cθ)− v(Yθ/wθ′),
then
u(Cθ)− v(Yθ/wθ′)−Oθ′θ ≤ u(Cθ′)− v(Yθ′/wθ′)−Oθ′θ ≤ u(Cθ)− v(Yθ/wθ)−Oθθ,
which implies that (Cθ, Yθ,Oθ) <θ (Cθ, Yθ,Oθ′) for any θ′ ∈ Θ.
Since A is incentive compatible, the agent prefers (Cθ, Yθ,Oθ) over the consumption
and income bundle (Cθ′ , Yθ′) for any other θ
′, with any occupational choice. If Oθ 6= Oθ′
then the constraints
u(Cθ)− v(Yθ/wθ) ≥ u(Cθ′)− v(Yθ′/wθ)
u(Cθ)− v(Yθ/wθ)−Oθθ ≥ u(Cθ′)− v(Yθ′/wθ′)−Oθ′θ,
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ensure that the agent prefers his assigned bundle over the other with both occupation
choices. Suppose, instead, that Oθ = Oθ′ . Take some θˆ such that Oθˆ 6= Oθ then
u(Cθ′)− v(Yθ′/wθˆ)−Oθˆθ ≤ u(Cθˆ)− v(Yθˆ/wθˆ)−Oθˆθ ≤ u(Cθ)− v(Yθ/wθ)−Oθθ,
where the first inequality follows from the intensive margin constraint for θˆ and the
second from the extensive margin constraint for θ. Furthermore, for any other allocation
(C, Y,O) 6∈ A, we have that C = Y − T (Y ) = 0, which implies that such a choice is
suboptimal.
This result implies that announcing a tax function common to all agents implements
the allocation A, with agents choosing their assigned bundles optimally.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
With the definition Uθ we can write the incentive compatibility for the extensive margin
choice as
Uθ −Oθθ ≥ Uθ′ −Oθ′θ.
Now, we use the fact that if θ, θ′ ∈ Θi then Oθ = Oθ′ and the two incentive com-
patibility constraints{
Uθ −Oθθ ≥ Uθ′ −Oθ′θ
Uθ′ −Oθ′θ′ ≥ Uθ −Oθθ′
⇔
{
Uθ ≥ Uθ′
Uθ′ ≥ Uθ,
which necessarily implies that Uθ = Uθ′ , and we define this as Ui for i = r, n.
For the next part, of the proposition we note that if we define
θ∗ = Un − Ur
we have, by construction, that for all θ ≤ θ∗
Un − θ ≥ Ur,
and for all θ > θ∗
Un − θ < Ur.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
The optimal plan, for a fixed τx, solves the following optimization problem
W (τx) = max UnF (θ
∗) + Ur
(
1− F (θ∗))− ˆ θ∗
−∞
θf(θ)d(θ) + g(G), s.to. (66)
[ηr(θ)] Un ≥ Ur + v
(Yθ
wr
)
− v
( Yθ
wn
)
, ∀θ ∈ Θr (67)
[ηn(θ)] Ur ≥ Un + v
( Yθ
wn
)
− v
(Yθ
wr
)
, ∀θ ∈ Θn (68)
[η] θ∗ = Un − Ur, (69)
[ψn(θ)] Un = u
(
Cθ
)− v(Yθ/wn), ∀θ ∈ Θn (70)
[ψr(θ)] Ur = u
(
Cθ
)− v(Yθ/wr), ∀θ ∈ Θr (71)
[λ]
ˆ
Θ
Cθf(θ)dθ +G(θ) ≤ Yn τx + α
α(1 + τx)
+
Yr
1 + τx
. (72)
[λn] Yn =
ˆ
Θn
Yθf(θ)dθ (73)
[λr] Yr =
ˆ
Θr
Yθf(θ)dθ. (74)
The variables inside squared parenthesis define the lagrange multipliers. Take wi > wj.
Part 1: To show that Yθ = Yj for all θ ∈ Θj. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that
Yθ 6= Yθ′ for θ, θ′ ∈ Θj. Then, take
Yˆ ≡ sup
θ∈Θj
Yθ.
Note that since Yˆ is the supremum of Yθ then it must be that
Ui ≥ Uj + v
( Yˆ
wj
)
− v
( Yˆ
wi
)
,
and furthermore, since wj < wi, then
v
( Yˆ
wj
)
− v
( Yˆ
wi
)
> v
(Yθ
wj
)
− v
(Yθ
wi
)
, ∀ Yθ < Yˆ .
46
Which implies that the incentive compatibilities for all other θ with lower income are
not binding.
Ui > Uj + v
(Yθ
wj
)
− v
(Yθ
wi
)
⇒ ηj(θ) = 0.
The first order conditions with respect to Cθ and Yθ are
ψj(θ)u
′(Cθ) = λf(θ),
ψj(θ)v
′(Yθ/wj) = λjf(θ), if Yθ < Yˆ .
Suppose first that there does not exist θ such that Yθ = Yˆ . In this case, optimality
requires that the following two conditions hold for all θ ∈ Θj
v′
(
Yθ/wj
)
u′
(
Cθ
) = λj
λ
,
Uj = u
(
Cθ
)− v(Yθ/wj).
This two conditions implicitly define a solution Cθ, Yθ which is constant across θ ∈ Θj,
thus reaching a contradiction.
Suppose instead that there exists θˆ such that Yθˆ = Yˆ . In this case the two conditions
above must continue to hold for all other θ. For θˆ it is true that
ψj(θˆ)u
′(Cθˆ) = λf(θˆ),
ψj(θˆ)v
′(Yθˆ/wj)+ ηj(θˆ)[v′(Yθˆ/wj)− v′(Y (θˆ)/wi)] = λjf(θˆ)⇔ ψj(θˆ)v′(Yθˆ/wj) < λjf(θˆ).
This implies that
v′
(
Yθˆ/wj
)
u′
(
Cθˆ
) < v′(Yθ/wj)
u′
(
Cθ
) ⇔ v′(Yθˆ/wj)
v′
(
Yθ/wj
) < u′(Cθˆ)
u′
(
Cθ
) ⇒ u′(Cθˆ)
u′
(
Cθ
) > 1⇒ Cθˆ < Cθ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Yθˆ > Yθ. This is clearly a contra-
diction because we must have that
Uj = u
(
Cθ
)− v(Yθ/wi) = u(Cθˆ)− v(Yθˆ/wi).
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Part 2: To show that Yθ = Yi for all θ ∈ Θi. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that
Yθ 6= Y (θ′) for θ, θ′ ∈ Θi. Then, take
Yˆ ≡ inf
θ∈Θi
Yθ.
Note that since Yˆ is the supremum of Yθ then it must be that
Uj ≥ Ui + v
( Yˆ
wi
)
− v
( Yˆ
wj
)
,
and furthermore, since wj < wi, then
v
( Yˆ
wj
)
− v
( Yˆ
wi
)
< v
(Yθ
wj
)
− v
(Yθ
wi
)
, ∀ Yθ > Yˆ .
Which implies that the incentive compatibilities for all other θ with higher income are
not binding.
Uj > Ui + v
(Yθ
wi
)
− v
(Yθ
wj
)
⇒ ηi(θ) = 0.
The first order conditions with respect to Cθ and Yθ are
ψi(θ)u
′(Cθ) = λf(θ),
ψi(θ)v
′(Yθ/wi) = λif(θ), if Yθ < Yˆ .
Suppose first that there does not exist θ such that Yθ = Yˆ . In this case, optimality
requires that the following two conditions hold for all θ ∈ Θi
v′
(
Yθ/wi
)
u′
(
Cθ
) = λi
λ
,
Ui = u
(
Cθ
)− v(Yθ/wi).
This two conditions implicitly define a solution Cθ, Yθ which is constant across θ ∈ Θi,
thus reaching a contradiction.
Suppose instead that there exists θˆ such that Yθˆ = Yˆ . In this case the two conditions
above must continue to hold for all other θ. For θˆ it is true that
ψi(θˆ)u
′(Cθˆ) = λf(θˆ),
ψi(θˆ)v
′(Yθˆ/wi)+ ηi(θˆ)[v′(Yθˆ/wi)− v′(Y (θˆ)/wj)] = λif(θˆ)⇔ ψj(θˆ)v′(Yθˆ/wi) > λif(θˆ).
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This implies that
v′
(
Yθˆ/wi
)
u′
(
Cθˆ
) > v′(Yθ/wi)
u′
(
Cθ
) ⇔ v′(Yθˆ/wi)
v′
(
Yθ/wi
) > u′(Cθˆ)
u′
(
Cθ
) ⇒ u′(Cθˆ)
u′
(
Cθ
) < 1⇒ Cθˆ > Cθ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Yθˆ < Yθ. This is clearly a contra-
diction because we must have that
Ui = u
(
Cθ
)− v(Yθ/wi) = u(Cθˆ)− v(Yθˆ/wi).
A.8 Endogenous occupational choice - The first-best alloca-
tion
The first-best planner in this environment solves
max
{Cθ,Nθ,Oθ}
ˆ
Θ
[
u
(
Cθ
)− v(Nθ)−Oθθ]f(θ)dθ + g(G), s.to.
[λ]
ˆ
Θ
Cθf(θ)dθ +G = A
(ˆ m
0
xρi di+
ˆ 1
m
nρi di
) 1−α
ρ
Nαn − φ
ˆ m
0
xidi
[λn] Nn =
ˆ
Θn
Nθf(θ)dθ, and [λr]
ˆ 1
m
nidi =
ˆ
Θr
Nθf(θ)dθ ≡ Nr.
The first-best allocation in this economy features production efficiency. This means
that if m is interior
xi =
{
Nr
1−m , i ∈ [0,m]
0, otherwise
ni =
{
0, i ∈ [0,m]
Nr
1−m , otherwise
m = 1−
[ φ
(1− α)A
]1/αNr
Nn
.
If two agents choose the same occupation, they have the same productivity. So,
the first best chooses the same allocation in terms of hours of work and consumption.
Then, define Ci and Ni the bundle given to the agents that are in occupation i = r, n.
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Using these optimality conditions we can rewrite the optimization problem as follows
max
{Cn,Nn,Cr,Nr,Oθ}
ˆ
Θn
[
u
(
Cn
)−v(Nn)−θ]f(θ)dθ+ˆ
Θr
[
u
(
Cr
)−v(Nr)]f(θ)dθ+g(G), s.to.
[λ]
ˆ
Θn
Cnf(θ)dθ +
ˆ
Θr
Crf(θ)dθ +G = wn
ˆ
Θn
Nnf(θ)dθ + wr
ˆ
Θr
Nrf(θ)dθ
How does the decision of whether an agent becomes routine or non routine looks
like? If the planner allocates household θ to a non-routine occupation, the contribution
to social welfare is
u
(
Cn
)− v(Nn)− θ + λ(wnNn − Cn).
If the allocates the household to a routine occupation the contribution is instead
u
(
Cr
)− v(Nr)+ λ(wrNr − Cr).
Clearly, the planner should allocate household θ to a non-routine occupation is the first
is greater than the second, this is
θ ≤ λ
[
(wnNn − Cn)− (wrNr − Cr)
]
+
[(
u
(
Cn
)− v(Nn))− (u(Cr)− v(Nr))] ≡ θ∗.
This equation defines a threshold rule, θ∗. All households with θ ≤ θ∗ should become
non-routine workers and those with θ > θ∗ should become routine workers. This thresh-
old rule balances the private costs choosing a non-routine occupation to household θ,
u
(
Cr
)− v(Nr)− [u(Cn)− v(Nn)− θ],
with the social benefit of generating more consumption goods
λ
[
(wnNn − Cn)− (wrNr − Cr)
]
.
We can rewrite the optimization problem for the social planner as follows
max
{Cn,Nn,Cr,Nr,θ∗}
[
u
(
Cn
)−v(Nn)]F (θ∗)+[u(Cr)−v(Nr)](1−F (θ∗))+g(G)−ˆ θ∗
−∞
θf(θ)dθ, s.to.
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[λ] CnF (θ
∗) + Cr(1− F (θ∗)) +G = wnNnF (θ∗) + wrNr(1− F (θ∗)).
The solution to this optimization problem satisfies the following optimality conditions
v′
(
Nn
)
u′
(
Cn
) = wn,
v′
(
Nr
)
u′
(
Cr
) = wn,
u′
(
Cn
)
= u′
(
Cr
)⇔ Cr = Cn,
θ∗ = λ
[
(wnNn − Cn)− (wrNr − Cr)
]
+
[(
u
(
Cn
)− v(Nn))− (u(Cr)− v(Nr))].
Using the fact that in the optimum Cn = Cr and that λwi = v
′(Ni), we can solve for
the threshold rule as a function of Nn and Nr
θ∗ =
[
v′
(
Nn
)
Nn − v
(
Nn
)]− [v′(Nr)Nr − v(Nr)].
When wn > wr, the optimal plan features Nn > Nr which implies that θ
∗ > 0.
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